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 Abstract – file sharing applications that operate as form of 
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks have been popular amongst users 
and developers for their heterogeneity and easy deployments 
features. However, they have been used for illegal activities 
online. This brings new challenges to forensic investigations in 
detecting, retrieving and analysing the P2P applications. We 
investigate the characteristics of I2P network in order to outline 
the problems and methods in detection of I2P artefacts. 
Furthermore, we present new methods to detect the presence of 
I2P using forensically approved tools and reconstruct the history 
of I2P activity using artefacts left over by I2P router software. 
 Keywords; P2P, I2P artefacts, Detection methods, 
Forensics Analysis, Security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The self-organising overlay networks that are distributed 
on IP networks are called P2P networks. P2P file-sharing 
networks reflect the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm with 
autonomous networked devices within distributed and 
decentralised systems. P2P networks are managed by 
protocols implemented at the application level. They are 
implemented on top of the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) or 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Furthermore, P2P 
overlays provide support for scalability within dynamic and 
decentralised systems. The nodes within a P2P system act in a 
self-managing manner in contrast to the client-server model. 
Such overlay networks go beyond the services offered by 
conventional client-server systems [1]. P2P systems are 
popular and pervasive, and largely used for file sharing and 
data communication. 
While the rapid growth and ubiquitous use of file sharing 
applications is generally positive for users, they introduce 
many challenges in forensic investigations. The dynamic 
change of membership, the geopolitical stance on copyright 
materials, legal and ethical issues in dealing with file sharing 
applications are some examples to include. However, the most 
challenging issue is overcoming the misuses provoked by 
capabilities of P2P network. Many law enforcement agencies 
struggle to keep up with the new tools and techniques which 
are misused by P2P users, who contribute to and facilitate 
illegal activities online. 
In this work we examine the characteristics of I2P networks or 
related applications which attract illegal activities and may 
pose a problem for the forensic analyst. Furthermore, we 
propose a number of alternative approaches to identify or 
reconstruct the suspect’s activity on I2P network and analyse 
the remaining artefacts using a mix of custom made and 
industry approved forensic tools.  
The rest of the paper is organised in the following structure; 
Section two introduces the I2P network, its current 
developments and the challenges it presents in forensic 
investigations. Section three outlines solution design and 
description of forensic procedures in I2P investigations. 
Section four includes related works and section five provides 
discussion and future direction of the research.  
II. Network Overlay 
Network overlay provides support for scalability within a 
dynamic and decentralised system with self-managing nodes. 
This means they can take advantage of the available resources, 
content and traffic stability independent of central servers. 
Nodes have dual client and server roles, meaning they can 
both initiate and listen for incoming connections. 
A.  P2P Networks 
A network overlay is a solution to address scalability issues 
within distributed systems. It is a virtual network of nodes and 
logical links built on top of the existing network. It can 
therefore be used to deliver additional services and 
functionalities which are not offered by the base network. 
Since overlay network avoids direct interaction with 
underlying infrastructure, it can be easily deployed without 
costly upgrades or interruptions to the base network services. 
Furthermore, it does not require modification of existing 
software or protocols in order for new nodes to join the 
overlay network. 
A P2P overlay provides support for scalability within a 
dynamic and decentralised system with self-managing nodes. 
This means all nodes contribute to and benefit from shared 
pool of network resources and content, without being reliant 
on any central server. 
There are many P2P networks with diverse properties 
classified based on different methods such as performance 
metrics, topology, protocol and structure [4]. P2P overlays are 
popular amongst users for file sharing and communication 
such as Skype, BitTorrent and Freenet. Each class of the 
system has its own advantages and disadvantages, but we will 
focus on P2P overlays that offer some degree of anonymity to 
their users. Anonymity is the main attribute that provides user 
privacy. But this feature is for incriminating activities from 
sharing copyrighted materials and cybercrimes to illegal 
transactions.  
B. I2P Network 
I2P (Invisible Internet Project) is an adaptation of Kademlia 
[3] developed to go a step further than just anonymity and 
enables users to access an isolated ‘darknet’. I2P provides 
P2P communication channel along with various protocols and 
encryption standards to maintain user anonymity. The end-to-
end communication between two users is not globally 
advertised and fully encrypted. I2P improves on standard 
TCP/IP communication model by ensuring that IP (Internet 
Protocol) packets exchanged between participating hosts 
always contain encrypted data. Instead of relying on IP 
addresses to uniquely identify hosts and route traffic, I2P 
introduces its own identifiers and routing logic at higher layer 
of the protocol stack. As long as Layer 4 network connectivity 
exists between hosts, I2P is able to operate in complete 
isolation from the rest of the public Internet infrastructure. 
These improvements aim to improve anonymity of network 
users by reducing the risk of malicious third party (such as a 
compromised Internet service provider) intercepting or 
altering the network traffic.  
 
a. I2P Routers 
I2P nodes communicate through a set of peer-to-peer tunnels 
facilitated by I2P router software. The nodes follow “garlic” 
routing logic, which requires use of separate tunnels for 
inbound and outbound traffic. Every transmitted message is 
relayed through chain of third-party I2P routers many times 
hiding the user identity completely. The communication 
between peers has no defined exit point from I2P to normal 
Internet, therefore avoiding issues seen within similar systems 
like Tor [6]. 
b. I2PSnark 
I2PSnark is the default torrent client for I2P network and is 
distributed as part of I2P router software. As a native I2P 
application, I2PSnark cannot understand IP addresses and is 
therefore unable to communicate over normal Internet. This 
limitation is intentional and ensures that no personally 
identifying P2P traffic can leak outside of encrypted I2P 
tunnel. Security and ease of use ensure continued popularity 
of I2PSnark with I2P network users. I2PSnark user base is 
larger than that of all other I2P torrent clients combined, with 
I2PSnark being responsible for one-third of total I2P network 
traffic [5]. 
P2P (BitTorrent) clients operating over normal Internet 
provide any member of the torrent swarm with information 
about all other peers. Forensic examiner can therefore obtain 
torrent creator’s IP address, which may then be checked via 
Internet Service Provider to determine the identity of illegal 
filesharer. Applying this method to I2PSnark yields only a list 
of peers’ I2P network identifiers, which have no forensic 
value.  
c. Domain name resolution 
The I2P project considers public Internet DNS (Domain Name 
Service) infrastructure to be unsuitable for use in anonymizing 
distributed overlay network. Internet’s DNS is seen as highly 
hierarchical structure, susceptible to both technical failure and 
takeover of domain names by malicious third parties. For 
these reasons, I2P network implements its own system for 
resolving short, human-readable domain names. 
As part of this system, every node in I2P network is expected 
to keep a local “addressbook”. The addressbook is a file 
which stores associations between an I2P domain name and 
I2P network identifier (instead of IP address). The concept is 
similar to use of hosts file by nodes of early Internet before 
the invention of DNS.  
To reduce the need for manual editing of hosts file, I2P 
implements a name record update mechanism known as 
“subscriptions”. I2P node user can specify several other nodes 
on the I2P network to be “subscription sources”, which will 
then be regularly polled for their copies of the addressbook. 
Any entries for domain names which are not present in the 
subscribed node addressbook are merged with current copy.  
The aim of described I2P system is to keep all information 
required for resolving domain names within secure I2P 
network, preferably on the local I2P node. Therefore, a 
forensic analyst who manages to obtain name resolution query 
logs from I2P user’s Internet Service Provider or DNS 
caching server on local network is unlikely to find any entries 
related to I2P.  
d. Darknets (eepsites) 
I2P uses its own domain name service which enables the 
existence of ‘eepsites’, hidden websites that can only be 
accessed by users connected to I2P overlay network.  Eepsites 
are hosted directly on I2P nodes and are accessed via names 
ending in ‘.i2p’ top-level domain as shown in Fig 1.  
 
Fig 1. Eepsites Cannot be Accessed from Normal Internet 
Within an investigation of a normal Internet website, the 
domain registration records and copy of DNS zone file can 
provide several key pieces of forensically valuable 
information. These include contact details of the registrar, 
personal details of the domain owner and resource records 
providing IP addresses of the host. In this way, the identity of 
the website owner can be identified and the host device seized 
for further investigation by the forensic analyst. 
This method is not effective against I2P eepsites. Normal 
Internet registrars are part of DNS hierarchy and therefore 
encouraged to cooperate with law enforcements under the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) scheme. I2P domain name registrars are 
anonymous, have no governing body and incur no penalty for 
ignoring laws, regulations or requests from law enforcement 
agencies. The process of eepsite name registration further 
ensures that no personal information or IP addresses are stored 
by registrar. 
The lack of access to hidden eepsites from Internet makes 
them invisible to Wayback Machine and search engine caches. 
These are frequently relied on by forensic analysts to prove 
the content of suspect website at certain point in time. Eepsites 
therefore are less consistent as evidence compared to normal 
websites because no backup copy of an eepsite can be located 
if it is shut down by its owner.  
e. Discovering an I2P installation 
The possible misuses of I2P network are less known among 
law enforcement agencies and forensic analysts. This may 
lead to I2P installation on seized machine not being 
discovered or not recognized as source of valuable forensic 
artefacts. 
The industry approved software such as EnCase and FTK has 
no analysis or detection functionality for I2P. As such they do 
not provide any insight into data left over by I2P software. 
I2P can be installed in one of the two modes on a Windows 
machine; either as an application or as a system service. The 
system service installations of I2P have more value to forensic 
analyst. This is due to the fact that I2P installation as service is 
preferred by users who require permanent connection to I2P 
network - for hosting of eepsites or sharing content. However, 
I2P installed as a system service is harder to discover due to 
lack of entries in Start Menu, Desktop and Most Recently 
Used (MRU) software lists.  
 
III. Forensic analysis of I2P 
I2P router software focuses strongly on security of network 
traffic rather than the data stored locally on participating I2P 
nodes. As a result, the local data is stored without encryption 
and can be of use to forensic analyst investigating a seized 
device. We conducted the following experiments in order to 
forensically evaluate the I2P network and assess how it can be 
used for illegal activities. Furthermore, we highlight how the 
functionalities and flaws within the network should be 
considered in forensic investigations. 
a. Investigation of I2P installers 
I2P installers for Windows family of operating systems 
contain several layers. The outer layer is a self-extracting 
archive of 7-Zip format, used to distribute the installer 
components in a single file and reduce the file size. Inner layer 
is a ‘PACK’ file created by IzPack installer generator for 
applications written in Java. Although there is no official 
unpacker for files made by IzPack, the structure of package 
file slightly resembles that of a forensic image and can 
therefore be reversed. IzPack package file contains a general 
file header, which is followed by files belonging to individual 
components of I2P router software. Individual component 
files within the package are designated by header and footer 
signatures, which also list the component file name, type and 
intended installation path.  
These component files can be extracted with a single script 
written in a programing language such as Python which is 
compatible with most forensic tools, and then used to either 
construct a hash set library or in manual comparison by 
forensic analyst. 
a. Detection via known hash set library 
The individual I2P components extracted from installer files 
can be used to produce hash set libraries. These libraries can 
be imported into approved forensic software that is currently 
unable to identify the presence of I2P within evidence. 
EnCase suite by Guidance Software is one example of 
forensic tool which is approved for generating legally valid 
forensic reports, but cannot detect I2P in its default 
configuration. EnCase, however, supports use of hash libraries 
containing MD5 and SHA1 hashes of known software. These 
hash libraries are used by forensic labs to either filter out 
known good software1 or detect known bad content such as 
illegal images or software with dubious uses. 
EnCase can therefore be equipped for detection of I2P by 
importing a legacy hash library containing MD5 hashes of I2P 
components. Some components of I2P are more suitable for 
this detection that others due to their unchanging nature. For 
example, I2P application itself is not a good candidate for 
hash library, as the hash changes with frequent releases of 
I2P. However, the digital certificates of I2P developer eepsites 
are good candidates, since these are present in every I2P node 
installation and remain unaffected across multiple version 
releases for years. 
b. Comparison of addressbooks 
One of the components of the I2P which can be extracted 
from I2P installer is the copy of the default addressbook. 
Every new I2P node is provided with the same copy of this 
addressbook during installation, so that it can access a basic 
minimal set of trustworthy eepsites. The I2P node is then 
expected to expand on this minimal addressbook by importing 
information from its own set of subscription sources and 
manual addition of eepsite domain name entries. 
Forensic analyst can use this minimal default addressbook as a 
reference to be compared against addressbook found on the 
seized machine. Entries which are not found in the default 
addressbook have either been imported via subscription 
updates or added manually by I2P node owner. Eepsite 
records originating from subscription can be further 
eliminated from this list via inspection of subscription update 
log2 entries such as update timestamp, source and domain 
name of imported record. Through this process of elimination, 
the addressbook from seized computer can be reduced to set 
of domain records which are highly likely to have been added 
by I2P node owner manually for his personal eepsite 
browsing. This information can be especially useful if the 
suspect has taken anti-forensic steps to eliminate browsing 
history and artefacts from his local machine. 
c. Takeover of existing registrars 
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  National Software Reference Library (NSRL) hash sets 
are produced for this purpose. 
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   Present in the 0.9.25 version of I2P 
Registrars in I2P network do not have to pass through any 
kind of accreditation or approval process. This makes it 
possible for any interested party to operate their own I2P 
domain name registrar node. Although it is possible for law 
enforcement or forensic analyst to setup their own new 
registrars on I2P network, some of existing known good 
registrars may also become vulnerable to takeover. The 
primary candidate for takeover would be registrar known as 
‘NO.i2p’. NO is a small registrar compared to developer 
operated ones like ‘Stats.i2p’, but still occupies a special 
position in I2P name resolution system. 
NO does not share permissive policy operated by ‘rogue’ 
registrars such as INR. Instead, NO shares same version of 
registration policy as developer-owned registrars, disallowing 
illegal or questionable content. Since there are no policy 
disagreements, NO is one of the few registrars considered 
“trusted” by I2P project team. As a trusted registrar, it is one 
of only four service choices shown to each I2P user who tries 
to access sites not known to local addressbook. 
As of early 2016, the NO registrar appears to have been 
abandoned by its owner. New domain requests can still be 
submitted by users through NO site, but are not reviewed by 
its operator. The database of the existing domains has not 
been purged or screened for content violations, with NO 
retaining name entries for resources which violate its own 
terms of registration, such as I2P mirror of Silk Road 
Reloaded website.  
The lack of maintenance together with the trusted status 
should make NO an attractive target for both law enforcement 
and malicious parties. Due to the lack of maintenance, NO is 
currently not receiving security updates for its I2P router 
software or the web server. An attacker with ability of 
compromising NO can gain control over a critical part of I2P 
infrastructure.  
The alternative option would be to wait until the failure of NO 
or its I2P server and resort to social engineering. Most of I2P 
registrars including NO are running name resolution software 
known as Py-I2PHosts, which is available for download from 
its developer eepsite on I2P network. It is therefore possible to 
recreate NO after its failure, but on different B32 and eepsite 
addresses. The recreated registrar can be then advertised on 
I2P community resources as resumed after hardware failure. 
Success of this method is possible due to the decentralised 
structure of I2P registrars, which offers no control over the 
membership. Any user can setup a high-value network service 
with minimal resources. Registrar ‘RUS.i2p’ was known for 
hosting I2P documentation and eepsite entries for users 
located in ex-CIS countries. After several extended outages 
and restorations of services, this registrar succumbed to a 
server hardware failure and is no longer available. Another of 
I2P registrars ‘NIC.i2p’ lost ownership of its original eepsite 
domain name and can be reached only through its full network 
address. Several I2P operators found this incident suspicious 
and questioned3 the operator’s ability to run a critical network 
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  ‘Nic.i2p’ – a real DNS provider for I2P- I2P Forum 
service. Despite this, the registrar remains operational at the 
time of this report and is included on unofficial “known good” 
registrar lists circulating in I2P user community. 
d. Mirroring of eepsites 
The non-hierarchical model of I2P name resolution system 
makes it possible for the forensic analyst to create own mirror 
of suspect website and register it under the same domain 
name. Domain names in I2P are guaranteed to be unique only 
per each registrar, but may not be unique for the entire I2P 
network. This makes it possible for the same I2P domain 
name to be associated with more than one host at the same 
time.  
Fig. 2 I2P Short Domain Names Are Unique per Registrar 
Due to complex propagation of I2P name updates, it is 
possible for the existing domain name to remain available on 
different registrars. For example, domain names registered via 
I2P registrar known as INR do not always propagate to other 
registrars due to INR’s untrusted status. 
This method of data collection should also be considered in 
relation to one peculiarity of I2P’s naming system - 
persistence of name records. Once the I2P node addressbook 
entry is stored, it never expires. The registrar from which this 
eepsite information was originally retrieved may have since 
updated the information or purged the domain from its 
database entirely. However, none of these events will affect an 
existing addressbook entry. The owner, staff and regular 
visitors of mirrored I2P site will therefore remain unaffected 
by intelligence gathering carried out on the false mirror site.  
The persistent addressbook entries work in favour of a 
forensic analyst or law enforcement agency. Eepsite owner 
and regular visitors are more likely to be security-conscious 
and very familiar with the “look and feel” of the compromised 
eepsite. This knowledge increases the risk of one of the 
visitors detecting inconsistencies in the false mirror site and 
alarming other users. In comparison, new or occasional 
visitors are less likely to be alarmed, since they do not have a 
reference to compare the mirror eepsite with.  
The resulting benefit is that false mirror eepsite can remain 
undetected for a long period of time, constantly gathering 
information about activity of new visitors. The longer false 
eepsite stays operational, the higher is the chance of it 
trapping one of the regular visitors. This may occur through 
migration to new device (e.g. to secure virtual machine or a 
machine with full-disk encryption) without adequate 
preparation or release of incompatible update to I2P, therefore 
requiring user to repopulate his addressbook entries. 
e. Locating I2P Node by Network Performance 
The use of denial-of-service attacks against I2P network has 
been proposed by Christopher Kack [7]. In attack known as 
“darkloris”, the malicious I2P nodes keep cyclically opening a 
large number of connections to service provided by target I2P 
node. These connections are initiated with the sole purpose of 
consuming the resources of target I2P node, but are never 
properly used or terminated by the malicious nodes.  
Kack successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of this 
attack against Jetty web server used by default in new 
installations of I2P router software. Despite Kack running his 
attack from a single malicious I2P node, the target node could 
not handle any more incoming connections to its web server, 
which resulted in all new eepsite visitors receiving an error 
page as shown in Fig 3. 
 
Fig 3. Kack's Generates Unused Connections to Target I2P Node 
 
The original version of denial-of-service attack used by Kack 
was mitigated with introduction of request rate limiter in I2P 
router software. However, this mitigation is not complete and 
does not protect I2P nodes against other varieties of denial-of-
service attacks. Instead of web server domain, the attack may 
instead focus on saturating the I2P encrypted tunnel limit, 
bandwidth or other resources of I2P node. The request rate 
limiter can be bypassed due to its reliance on I2P network 
identifier of the attacking node, which is not permanently 
assigned and can be changed by attacker every time one of his 
controlled nodes becomes blacklisted. 
After the initial denial-of-service attack on I2P service node, 
the expected response of its operator was to increase the ratio 
of system resources available on I2P. This includes increasing 
the total bandwidth permitted, tunnel limit and memory size 
within I2P router configuration. However, this allows I2P 
router to accommodate an even larger denial of service attack, 
capable of having an impact on the I2P router. Network 
equipment used by the host is the first candidate for failure. 
The P2P aspect of I2P means that an active I2P router will be 
constantly receiving a large number of inbound TCP and UDP 
packets from a similarly large pool of unique remote IP 
addresses. The self-hosted I2P nodes running behind NAT 
may stop responding altogether, both on I2P network and the 
Internet. If the I2P router is monitored, the change in network 
performance or availability can be linked to denial of service 
attack.  
An investigation of I2P network found that approximately half 
of total I2P network nodes do not stay connected for longer 
than a week [8]. This behaviour suggests presence of large 
number of nodes that are running over residential DSL or 
mobile broadband connections, which would be unable to 
properly handle large number of P2P packets and therefore 
vulnerable to this kind of attack. 
The initial sample of IP addresses which need monitoring can 
be obtained by parsing I2P’s floodfill database, a copy of 
which is kept by every I2P floodfill router. Adrian 
Crenshaw’s research into identification of remote eepsites has 
produced a set of Python scripts for extracting this 
information [9].  
Ordinary nodes which are not floodfill routers can be removed 
from candidate list, therefore reducing total list of candidates 
to a manageable number (several hundred). This is due to the 
way I2P determines promotion of ordinary routers to floodfill 
nodes. As of version 0.9.23, any I2P router which allows 
sufficient bandwidth to be shared by network is allowed to 
switch into floodfill node. A node which managed to remain 
available after the first denial-of-service attack is therefore 
highly likely to be a floodfill node and present on the 
extracted list.  
If required, candidate list can be reduced further by 
continuous monitoring of floodfill nodes’ availability and 
geolocation by IP. Any node that becomes unreachable while 
the targeted I2P service is still online is no longer a candidate. 
Geographic filtering becomes possible if some information 
about targeted node operator is known from other sources: 
social engineering, timestamps or accidental posting of 
information. All floodfill router records in NetDB have their 
IP addresses stored and therefore can be mapped [5]. 
The remaining suspect node IP addresses can then be 
monitored for signs of change in network performance such as 
dropped packets and increased round-trip times. The attacking 
nodes on I2P network can be commanded to cyclically 
connect and disconnect from suspect eepsite or other resource 
in order to produce a more visible pattern of changes over 
longer period of time. 
IV. RELATED WORKS 
Freenet [3] is an unstructured P2P system that has been 
designed to exchange information between users. It allows 
content to be published and retrieved in an anonymous way. 
Both the source and destination of the information are 
withheld from third parties and even from the system servers. 
Peers joined to the network participate in queries, data storage 
and retrieval of data items. 
Freenet does not assign responsibility for documents to 
specific nodes and instead allows lookups to be carried out by 
searching for cached copies. Freenet aims to provide a flat 
Internet topology. In other words, you can communicate with 
an IP address next door, the same way you would 
communicate with another IP on the other side of the planet, 
without being discovered. It was first used by a large 
community of online users to distribute copyrighted materials 
on the Internet without being discovered. Clarke [3] claims 
that this was not the purpose of the project, which was 
originally set up to counter rogue governments' attempts to 
impose censorship on the flow of information in the press, 
broadcasts and printed materials. Freenet nodes are encrypted 
and routed through other nodes to make it extremely difficult 
to determine its originator as well as content [3]. A request for 
key is passed along peers using flooding algorithm, which 
returns the corresponding data. These keys are location-
independent. If a node received a request and knows the 
location of the file, it forwards it to the destination, which 
holds the information. If the node does not know the 
destination address, it forwards it to a node, which might hold 
the information or is likely to know the whereabouts of the 
resource.  
To make the routing more efficient and smart, Freenet uses 
historical information and statistics from previous routing 
experiences to make a decision-based estimate of the time it 
might take to reach the destination. Caching based on 
specialisation of the nodes accumulated cache of the 
information resulted in Freenet failing to cope with 
overwhelming requests and collapsing in July 2003. It was 
then that the designer addressed the load balancing issues by 
ensuring the uniform load distribution and constraining 
queries to maintain the defined quota. Considering this 
approach has addressed the problem and works effectively, 
but it may lead to functionality issues by limiting incoming 
requests to retrieve resources. This means that individual 
nodes behaving other than anticipated may affect load 
balancing and increase request failure rate. Therefore, the 
challenge in terms of scalability and performance still persists 
within the Freenet structure. Like any other P2P system, nodes 
in Freenet can have a dual role and are not distinguishable by 
name. This component of the system improves the anonymity. 
However, an adversary can still identify the traffic load and 
distinguish server nodes using a packet analyser. Having said 
that, Freenet remains one the important systems in providing 
user anonymity. 
The Onion Router (Tor) is a distributed overlay network to 
anonymise TCP-based applications such as instant messaging, 
web applications and secure shell [10]. Each node in Tor 
chooses a path, builds a circuit with its neighbours known as 
successor and predecessor. The traffic is relayed through 
fixed-sized circuits and unwrapped by symmetric key at each 
node similar to layers of an onion. Tor uses the incremental 
relay of messages provides complete anonymity. The use of 
encryption at each layer provides data integrity. In order to 
avoid  alteration by nodes, Tor encrypts the messages before 
they leave the source node.   
However, there are some weaknesses that have been found 
within Tor [6], [11]. Adversaries can also target single points 
of failure within Tor network, such as exit and directory 
nodes. 
Like I2P, Tor is vulnerable against CPU-consumed denial of 
service attacks.  However, Tor provides low latency and high 
bandwidth which makes it attractive for users who share 
instant messages and large size files. The issues found in Tor 
can be used to de-anonymise the users or decrypt the 
transmitted messages. However, this is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Nonetheless, like any other anonymity service 
online, Tor remains a challenge in any forensic investigation.  
V.CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
While the anonymity systems maintain user privacy, promote 
free speech and facilitate free flow of information, they may 
be misused for illegal and questionable activities. Because of 
technological, geopolitical and legal challenges identifying 
and accessing such activities is an issue for forensic analyst 
and law enforcement agencies. We studied some security 
issues and core functions of I2P through an experiment to 
improve its detection by well established forensic software. 
We analysed different features and characteristics of I2P 
network that can be used for illegal activities online. Our 
analysis and experiments show that privacy model offered by 
I2P is comprehensive, but still leaves forensically valuable 
artefacts that can be extracted by custom written tools.  Such 
solutions can be integrated within the industry approved 
forensic tools to promote better practice in I2P investigations 
within law enforcement and to enhance the continuity of the 
evidence. 
For the future works, we will investigate the security flows of 
I2P in more details in order to provide a better understanding 
of the system. This will contribute to effective and efficient 
investigation of I2P activities.  
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